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Key words: Carlists, First Carlist War, Holy See, Pope Gregory XVI, Spanish Church.


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Introduction

One of the key points in the study of international policy in the 1830s is the analysis of relations of different European states with the counterparts of the First Carlist War in Spain (1833–1840). It is known that Great Britain, France, and Portugal (after the fall of Miguel I) embraced the Queen Isabel's cause (the “Cristinos”), while Austria, Prussia, Russia, and some Italian states tended to support Don Carlos's claims to the Spanish throne. The Pope Gregory XVI sympathized with the Carlists [Pérez 1997, p. 572; Vilar 2016, pp. 723–734; Izquierdo 2018, p. 275], but the Holy See did not recognize neither Don Carlos as the King of Spain, neither Isabel as the Queen. In 1835 the diplomatic relations between Spain and the Holy See were broken. After that, on 25 September 1835, J.A. Mendizábal became the Prime Minister of Spain. He realized the so-called desamortización (confiscation of Church property) that exerted a considerable influence on the position of Catholic Church in Spain in the second quarter of the XIX century. The break of diplomatic relations and desamortización had negative consequences for the Church in Spain that suffered under “the church-hostile” (“kirchenfeindlich”) government, in words of F. X. Seppelt and K. Löfler [Seppelt, Löfler 1933, S. 395]. There were no appointments of bishops in Spain in 1834–47, and there were forty vacant episcopal sees in the country [Cárcel 2003, p. 112]. According to B. Nellessen, the Spanish Church has never recovered from the effects of the events of 1833-40 [Nellessen 1960, S. 32].

During the First Carlist War Don Carlos tried to persuade the “conservative powers” (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) to overtly support his claims to the throne and to recognize him as the legitimate King of Spain. Nevertheless, the foreign courts that were supposed to support the Carlist movement preferred to wait for the victory of the insurrection or for a fundamental change in the course of war. The Chancellor of the Austrian empire K. von Metternich expressed the joint position of the “northern powers” in one of his private letters: “Que feront les puissances et que sont-elles décidées à faire, dans le cas où Don Carlos, reconnu Roi par elles, serait expulsé de son Royaume? Le soutiendront-elles? Dans ce cas, quels sont leurs moyens d'action? Et si elles ne le soutiennent pas, quelles seront, dans cette supposition, les conséquences de la preuve qu'elles offriraienlors aux yeux de l'Europe attentive que la protection des deux puissances maritimes est plus favorable aux prétendants à des couronnes que celle des trois Cours?” (Metternich to Apponyi, 17 Sept. 1834).

The Holy See followed the course of the “northern powers” in this matter of international affairs. It is undeniable that Austria exerted considerable influence on the Holy See's policy in the 1830s [Martina 2002; Chadwick 2003, pp. 1–50]. The Pope had the same reasons as the Austrian Chancellor not to recognize Don Carlos as the King of Spain despite the requests by the pretender to throne. On 16 December 1834, Don Carlos sent a letter directly to Gregory XVI (the message was accompanied by a brief note by the Bishop of León and was brought to Rome by the ambassador of Don Carlos in Naples José Alvarez de Toledo y Dubois). The Carlist leader asked the Pontiff for the official recognition: “Mes droits à la couronnée Espagne depuis la mort de mon très affectionnéfrère Ferdinam’d’imposent le devoir de faire connaître à Votre Saintetèmes intentions et ma fermeré solution de les soutenir. Dans le but que je me propose, j’ai non seulement en vue la défense de mes droits, mais encore la conservation de notre sainte religion que la secte impie qui veut dominer l’Espagne a juré d’anéantir” (Bishop of León to Gregory XVI, 16 Dec. 1834).

That was not the only letter from the pretender to the Spanish throne to the Pope. However, Don Carlos's claims were never officially recognized as legitimate by the Holy See.

The Holy See's policy in Spain depended upon the position of the Secretaries of State Cardinal Tommaso Bernetti (1831–1836) and Cardinal Luigi Lambruschini (1836–1841). The Secretary of State obtained the most relevant information about the situation in Spain from the apostolic nuncio in Madrid. In 1827–1833 this position was occupied by Francesco Tiberi. In September 1833, two weeks before the death of Ferdinand VII and the start of the First Carlist War, a new nuncio arrived to the capital of Spain. His name was Luigi Amat di San Filippo e Sorso [Tantillo 1960]. He stayed in Madrid till the summer of 1835 [Becker 1908, p. 95]. His correspondence to the Secretary of State T. Bernetti is a valuable source of information concerning the Holy See's policy in Spain in the beginning of the First Carlist War.

The State of the Question

Some aspects of the relations between the Holy See and Spain during the First Carlist War were reflected in the historiography of the XIX century. E. g., L. C. Farini in his work Lo Stato Romano dall'anno 1815 all'anno 1850 mentioned the Holy See's financial support to the Carlist cause during the war, but did not give any detailed information concerning that issue [Farini 1850, p. 78]. The first investigation that paid serious attention to the Holy See-Spain relations during the conflict was the book by J. Becker Relaciones diplomáticas entre España y la Santa Sede durante el siglo XIX published in 1908 [Becker 1908]. The investigation covered the whole XIX century, but made a special emphasis on the period of 1833–1835. The author showed the background of the break of diplomatic relations and analyzed reasons of anticlerical violence in Spain in 1834–1835. J. Becker based his study on some documents from Spanish archives and did not use the Vatican's sources.

In 1947 A.C. Jemolo published in Ressegna Storica del Risorgimento a short article dedicated to the apostolic nunciature in Madrid in the beginning of the First Carlist War [Jemolo 1947]. The study

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was based on the materials from *Vatican Secret Archives (Archivio segreto vaticano)*. It revealed some unknown facts about the Holy See's policy in Spain in the 1830s. The main disadvantage of A.C. Jemolo's research was the absence of references to Spanish sources. Nevertheless, the article could be considered a relevant study in the field of Spain-Vatican relations during the First Carlist war.

After the publication of A.C. Jemolo's article, Italian historians continued research in the field of the Holy See's international policy in Spain in the 1830s. E. Morelli wrote the book *La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti, Segretario di Stato di Gregorio XVI* [Morelli 1953]. T. Bernetti was the Secretary of State when the First Carlist War began. Consequently, the book carefully studies the Spanish problem in the Holy See's international policy. Some ideas of E. Morelli about the attitude of Pope's officials towards the Spanish events need to be revised. E.g., the Italian historian stated that L. Amat insisted on the recognition of the Spanish events need to be revised. E.g., the Italian historians continued research in the 1830s. The main disadvantage of A.C. Jemolo's research was the absence of references to Spanish sources. Nevertheless, the article could be considered a relevant study in the field of Spain-Vatican relations during the First Carlist war.

The results of the previous investigations were used in the biographies of L. Amat and T. Bernetti published in *Dizionario biografico de gli italiani* in 1960 and 1967 respectively [Tantillo 1960; Pignatelli 1967]. In the same time the study of the issue was developed in Spanish historiography, in the works of F. Izaguirre [Izaguirre 1958], J. Gorricho [Gorricho 1962], and V. Cárcel [Cárcel 1974; Cárcel 1975]. V. Cárcel also published a collection of documents dedicated to the apostolic nunciature in Madrid [Cárcel 1982], M. Revuelta analyzed the reasons of the anticlerical violence in Spain in 1834 [Revulta 1982]. These researchers centered their attention on the Spain-Vatican relationships from the Spanish point of view.

There should be mentioned some important investigations in that field in the last 5–10 years. A. Moliner Prada studied internal changes in the Spanish Church in the XIX century. The researcher showed that in 1834–1843 the Spanish Church “fortified relations of unconditional subordination to the pontifical authority” [Moliner 2016]. Serious economic and political losses suffered by the Spanish Church after the break of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Spain led to the loss of certain independence that the Spanish Church had had before.

M.J. Vilar studied the development of Spanish international policy towards Vatican under the rule of the Prime Minister Francisco Martinez de la Rosa (January 1834 – June 1835). The non-recognition of the new nuncio by the Spanish authorities, and the non-recognition of the Queen Isabel by the Holy See, as well as the start of anticlerical violence in 1834–1835 in Spain led to the break of diplomatic relations. The researcher from the University of Murcia tried to show that the Holy See's policy of non-recognition of neither of the two counterparts in the First Carlist War was favorable for Don Carlos's cause [Vilar 2016, p. 724]. The mutual non-recognition and the development of the Holy See-Spain relations that led to the break in 1835 were studied in the article by A. Tereshchuk “Apostolic Nunciature in Madrid and Relations between the Holy See and Spain in 1833–1835” published in 2019 [Tereshchuk 2019]. The investigation focused on the relations between the government of F. Martinez de la Rosa and the Secretary of State T. Bernetti, but it did not analyze the Holy See's policy towards the Carlists.

**Methodology**

The most of studies dedicated to the First Carlist War indicate that the Holy See tended to support the Carlist movement. Nevertheless, the fact is, the attitude of Pope's officials towards the insurrection in the north of Spain was more sophisticated. The Holy See's representatives in Madrid were considering perspectives of the Carlists, and were reporting their conclusions to the Secretary of State.

The scope of the present article is to study the attitude of the apostolic nuncios F. Tiberi and L. Amat towards the Carlist movement and the situation in Spain. The opinions expressed by the two diplomats in their correspondence with the Secretary of State T. Bernetti exerted influence on the Holy See's international policy in Spain during the First Carlist War. The analysis of their letters will show what information about the Carlists was presented to the Pope. The study will be relevant for the further investigation in the field of the Holy See's international policy in the 1830s.

There were studied letters by the apostolic nuncios in Madrid F. Tiberi and L. Amat sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State T. Bernetti between January 1832 and July 1835. On 30 January 1832, the Queen Maria Cristina gave birth to her second child, the Princess Luisa Fernanda. The arrival of a female child shattered the hope to solve the dynastic dispute that had started after the publication of the Pragmatic Sanction (1830), and that later would provide “the trigger for war” [Lawrence 2014, p. 3]. July 1835 was chosen as the other limit of the research because this date corresponds to the suppression of the Society of Jesus in Spain and L. Amat's departure from Madrid [Becker 1908, pp. 94–95].

The research is based on the documents from the *Vatican secret archives (Archivio Segreto Vaticano)*. There were studied materials from the Secretariat of State archives, archive fund *International policy (Esteri)*, sub-fond (rubrica) 249, folders 438 and 439 (parts 1 and 2 of the folder 439). The folders contain documents concerning the apostolic nunciature in Madrid affairs in 1832–1835.

**Results of the investigation**

The First Carlist War began on 2 October 1833, a few days after the death of the King Ferdinand VII. The roots of the split in the Spanish society could be found in the times of the Peninsular War (1808–1814) and the Liberal Triennium (1820–1823) [Tereshchuk 2017, c. 84].
The crisis expanded after the publication of the Pragmatic Sanction on 29 March 1830, and after the birth of the Princess Isabel on 10 October 1830. The King's daughter became the heir to the throne instead of Ferdinand's brother Carlos Maria Isidro (Don Carlos) [Yurchik 2014, c. 296–299].

The most conservative part of Spanish society sided with Don Carlos. During the First Carlist War his partisans were known as Carlists (although the term Carlist appeared in the late 1820s). The supporters of constitutional reforms put their hopes on the little Princess Isabel and on her mother, Queen Maria Cristina.

In 1827–1833 F. Tiberi was the apostolic nuncio in Madrid. He had a negative opinion on the camarilla surrounding Don Carlos. The nuncio did not profess any sympathies towards the Liberals, but he considered intrigants and plotters the Bishop of León Joaquín Abarca and Archbishop of Cuba Cirilo Alameda y Brea [Jemolo 1947, p. 8]. Both of them joined the Carlist cause after 1833.

After the political crisis in September 1832 [Verdeguer 1947], the division between the Liberals and the Absolutists became more ostensible. Carlism from the very beginning of its existence proclaimed its attachment to the traditional Catholicism and Ultramontanism (see: [Torres 2019]). As it was stated by the French historian J. Pérez, the religion was a guaranty of political and social order based on the notions of hierarchy, duties, and responsibility [Pérez 1997, p. 571]. In such a way, the nuncio, who did not feel sympathy with Don Carlos's partisans, was considered to be one of the prominent figures in the “Absolutist camp”. On 19 December 1832 F. Tiberi reported to T. Bernetti the circumstances of his official meeting with the King and other members of the royal family. He told that the “cold silence” of the Queen was “quite eloquent”, and stated the “absolute benevolence” of Don Carlos (Francesco Tiberi to Tommaso Bernetti, 19 Dec. 1832). These attitudes show political preferences and attitude to the Holy See of the future counterparts in the First Carlist War.

In March 1833 don Carlos had to leave the country and to settle in Portugal. According to the correspondent of Morning Herald M.B. Honan, “the sending of Don Carlos out of Madrid before Ferdinand's death was a masterpiece of Zea Bermúdez's policy” [Honan 1836, p. 391]. Nevertheless, the split in Spanish society became more evident. The don Carlos's supporters continued their protest against Isabel's rights to the throne. On 20 June 1833 the Cortes assembled to take an oath to the Princess Isabel as to the legitimate heir. King Ferdinand II of the two Sicilies later stated that the Cortes would not recognize Isabel as the heir in June 1833. There were only a few exceptions. J. Pérez writes that apart from the aforementioned Archbishop of Toledo, the Bishop of Orihuela Félix Herrero y Valverde, and the Archbishop of Zaragoza Bernardo Francés Caballero openly expressed their protest against the Pragmatic Sanction [Pérez 1997, p. 571]. We should add to the names mentioned by the French historian also that of the Bishop of León Joaquín Abarca. The fact of recognizing Isabel as the heir by the most of Spanish Bishops did not mean that the high clergy gave up on the idea of supporting don Carlos. It could be supposed that while Ferdinand VII was still alive, and as far as the Holy See seemed ready to recognize Isabel, the Spanish Bishops preferred not to escalate the conflict.

On 12 September 1833 L. Amat came to Madrid (Francesco Tiberi to Tommaso Bernetti, 12 Sept. 1833). When the new nuncio arrived, the King was already ill, and L. Amat could not present his credentials to Ferdinand VII. On 29 September the King died, and on 2 October the first Carlist uprisings started. As was already mentioned, the Holy See did not recognize Isabel as the Queen, and, consequently, the Spanish authorities did not recognize L. Amat as the apostolic nuncio. For almost two years that L. Amat spent in Madrid he did not have any official status in the Spanish capital [Tereshchuk 2019]. In the present research L. Amat is designated as “nuncio”, because from the point of view of Vatican high officials he was the legitimate diplomatic representative of the Pope in Spain. Considering the difficult political situation in the country at the moment of L. Amat's arrival, F. Tiberi decided to extend his stay at the Spanish Court. The ex-nuncio departed from the capital of Spain only on 27 May 1834 (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 28 May 1834).

After the beginning of the First Carlist War, both L. Amat and F. Tiberi began sending T. Bernetti almost everyday reports about military operations in the north of Spain and political situation in Madrid. As it was noted, E. Morelli in his monograph stated that L. Amat had a negative attitude towards the carlists. After the analysis of L. Amat's letters, it could be affirmed that the new nuncio sympathized with the rebels, although he critically evaluated their chances to win the war. After the execution on 14 October 1833 of general Santos Ladrón, L. Amat wrote that the general was the leader who had the most authority and respect among
the carlists, and that his death was a serious blow to the Don Carlos’s cause (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 19 Oct. 1833). That opinion concerning Santos Ladrón could be seen as overwhelming among the historians who write about the conflict. Nevertheless, in one of the recent books dedicated to the First Carlist War, M. Lawrence expressed an opinion that the execution of the popular general was a reason for hundreds of Navarrese to take arms to revenge his death; in such a way, this event stimulated the spread of Carlist revolt in the region [Lawrence 2014, p. 49].

A month later L. Amat wrote T. Bernetti that the Carlist movement did not have a strong leader that could unite all the forces of the rebels (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 23 Nov. 1833). The letter was sent on 23 November 1833. In fact, 9 days earlier, on 14 November, Tomás de Zumalacárregui was elected as the commander-in-chief of the Carlist troops in Navarre. The date of dispatch of the letter shows that the authorities in Madrid had not yet received at that moment the information about the election of T. de Zumalacárregui.

L. Amat was sceptical about the chances of the Carlists to win the war, but he had an opinion that don Carlos should return to Spain and take command of his troops. On 20 December 1833 he wrote that the Spanish authorities were afraid of a possible entrance of the pretender to the throne to the Spanish territory in Galicia (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 20 Dec. 1833). On the last day of 1833 the nuncio repeated in his letter that Cea Bermúdez’s government had serious concerns about that opportunity. There were rumours in Madrid that the King of Portugal Miguel I would send a force of 3,000–4,000 soldiers to help don Carlos (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 31 Dec. 1833). Obviously, these rumours never became truth. In spring 1834 Miguel I lost the civil war in his country, signed the convention of Évoramonte, and left Portugal.

The first exits of the Carlist troops in the north led by Zumalacárregui [Albi de la Cuesta 2017, pp. 189–222] made L. Amat be more optimistic about the perspectives of the Don Carlos’s cause. On 4 February 1834 the nuncio forecasted the “imminent triumph” of the Carlists, but did not propose to recognize don Carlos as the King (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 4 February 1834). The situation changed after 22 April 1834. Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain formed the coalition known as the “Quadruple Alliance”. The purpose of the alliance was to fight the Carlists and Migueleños in Spain and Portugal, respectively. On 17 May 1834 L. Amat reported to the Holy See his considerations concerning the coalition. The nuncio made analysis of possible consequences of the treaty. Apart from negative repercussions on the Carlist movement, the creation of the Quadruple Alliance could change the political situation in Europe. He characterized the union as a “powerful league” and indicated that one day it could menace “the northern powers” (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 17 May 1834).

L. Amat regretted the anticlerical violence in different parts of Spain in 1834–1835. In his letters he often reported numerous cases of aggression against the priests and churches. E. g., on 7 January 1834 he indicated that in some churches in Catalonia the Christmas mass was interrupted by “Liberals” who entered these temples “dancing, crying, and shouting” (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 7 Jan. 1834). There were two moments of apophasis of anticlerical violence during the First Carlist War, in the summers of 1834 and 1835. In these two summers it could be observed a burning of churches and monasteries, and murders of clergymen. The people who represented the lowest social classes were killing monks and priests on the streets of Madrid, Barcelona, and some other cities under control of the Cristinos. The attacks were “vaguely supported” by the authorities, according to R. de la Cierva [Cierva 1974, p. 51].

The street violence combined with anticlerical measures by the Spanish authorities in Madrid. On 4 July 1835 it was suppressed the Society of Jesus (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 7 July 1835). The possible measures against the Jesuits had been discussed in Spanish society for more than a year. Yet in April 1834 L. Amat reported to T. Bernetti that he had received information “from multiple sources” that the government was preparing the suppression of the society (Luigi Amat to Tommaso Bernetti, 14 April 1834). In the anticlerical riots in Madrid in the summer of 1834, fifteen Jesuits were killed [Gwynn 1932, p. 88]. One year later, the new Minister of State, Count of Toño decided to suppress the society trying “to win at least the acquiescence of the radicals” [Callahan 1984, p. 156].

The prohibition of the Society of Jesus was the matter for the Holy See to recall the nuncio from Spain [Becker 1908, p. 95]. The Secretary of State was pondering the opportunity to withdraw the Vatican representative from Madrid in 1834–1835. On 25 April 1835 T. Bernetti ordered L. Amat to request his passport in case the government would not recognize him as the nuncio (Tommaso Bernetti to Luigi Amat, 25 April 1835). In such a way, the suppression of the Jesuits became “the last straw” that influenced the decision of the Holy See and led to the definite break of the diplomatic relations. L. Amat left the capital of Spain. The Spanish representative in Vatican “was tolerated” in Rome till the end of the war, but he did not have any official status.

Concluding remarks

F. Tiberi and L. Amat did not sympathized neither with the Cristinos nor with the Carlists. The nuncio in 1827–1833 could be described as a supporter of the policy of noninterference in Spanish affairs. His position was not acceptable for the Pope and the Secretary of State (otherwise, they would not have recalled him in the beginning of a new political crisis). In the meantime, he also was persona non grata for the supporters of Isabel and María Cristina. F. Tiberi stayed in Madrid till the end of May 1834, but could
not help to find a compromise between the Holy See and the new Spanish government.

The new nuncio L. Amat did not have negative attitude towards the Carlists (as it was stated by some researchers), but did not believe in success of their cause. He made some interesting observations concerning the course of war, collected the rumours about the future development of the conflict, and presented in his letters analysis of international situation in the beginning of the First Carlist War. L. Amat’s reports to the Secretary of State T. Bernetti exerted influence on the Holy See’s international policy.

The diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Spain were broken de jure in September 1833 when the new nuncio did not present his credentials to the Regent Maria Cristina. “The point of no return” in the Holy See-Spain relations was the suppression of the Society of Jesus in July 1835 and the consequent recall of L. Amat from Madrid. After the assignment to the position of Secretary of State of Cardinal L. Lambruschini on 12 January 1836, the reestablishment of relations became impossible. The new Secretary of State had a reputation of a supporter of the Absolutist cause, and his assignment showed that the Pope was not disposed to make concessions in his international policy.

As a result of the Holy See's international policy in the first half of 1830s, the position of Catholic Church in Spain suffered considerable changes. The Church lost a lot of its political influence and financial capacities in the country.

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